President Macron’s visit to Algeria from August 25 to 27, 2022 aimed to rebuild the link with this country which occupies a special place in French history.
The bilateral relationship had indeed deteriorated markedly in recent years, despite the many memorial gestures made by Paris following the recommendations of the Stora report, France having in particular recognized acts of torture and enforced disappearances during the war of Algeria, as well as the massacre of Algerians in Paris during the FLN demonstration of October 17, 1961.
This degradation was explained in particular by remarks made by Emmanuel Macron on September 30, 2021, on the non-existence of the Algerian nation before French colonization, which had led to the recall of the Algerian ambassador to Paris for several months and the prohibition of the overflight of Algerian territory by French military planes to go to Mali or Niger.
It remains that France and Algeria both have an interest in protecting this privileged relationship.
A partial emancipation of Algeria vis-à-vis France
Let us first recall that France’s loss of influence in Algeria is a phenomenon that has been observed for a long time and which is not attributable to President Macron.
France has for decades now been challenged in Africa and, in particular, in Algeria, by emerging powers. The second world power, China, has supplanted it as Algeria’s main trading partner. Turkey is also asserting itself in Algeria, which is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which had exercised its domination in Algeria before the French conquest in 1830. As for Russia, it is the main supplier of arms to Algeria. since 1962. But it also sells weapons in Morocco, including tanks and armored vehicles.
The French have lost big contracts. Suez no longer manages water in Algiers. Aéroports de Paris has lost the management contract for Algiers airport, which has recently expanded. The RATP is no longer in charge of the operation of the Algiers metro. French as a foreign language is also losing ground in Algeria compared to English.
However, Algeria cannot do without France and the European Union. The country is currently experiencing relative isolation. Algiers still has allies in the region, notably in the person of Tunisian President Kais Saïed, who is increasingly displaying his support for Arab nationalism. But she takes a dim view of the interference in Libya by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which are important supporters of Marshal Haftar, who is very powerful in Cyrenaica. Algeria is indeed very concerned to protect its vast borders and seeks to defend them while maintaining its traditional doctrine of non-intervention outside its territory.
[ More than 80,000 readers trust The Conversation newsletter to better understand the world’s major issues. Subscribe today ]
Its current relative isolation was prompted by the Abraham Accords of September 15, 2020, which resulted in a normalization of relations between Israel and some Arab countries, including Morocco, which recognized the Israeli state.
In return, the United States recognized the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara, which goes against the position of Algeria, which supports the fight of the Polisario Front for the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people. Madrid has also recognized the Moroccanness of Western Sahara, which has greatly displeased Algiers, which has stopped its gas deliveries to Spain through the Maghreb Europe gas pipeline, which passes through Morocco.
While, because of the war in Ukraine, deliveries of Russian gas to EU countries should drop significantly, can Algeria take over from Moscow in this area? For the time being, 8% to 9% of the gas consumed in France comes from Algeria. Algerian gas arrives in France either by gas pipeline via gas interconnections with European countries or by sea transport via LNG (liquefied natural gas). A certain number of technical problems must be settled between the French and the Algerians to allow an increase in these deliveries.
Emmanuel Macron does not appear to be a supporter of the Midcat gas pipeline, which would connect Spain to France and would make it possible to increase deliveries of Algerian gas currently passing through the Medgaz gas pipeline. A possible solution would involve the construction of a floating liquefied gas terminal in Le Havre. Things are easier with Italy: Algiers has increased its gas deliveries to the Italians via the Transmed gas pipeline which runs from Hassi R’Mel in Algeria to Bologna, passing through Sicily and Tunisia.
The role of Algeria in the Malian conflict and French strategic interests
The renewed partnership between France and Algeria takes on a strategic character in these conditions. The French need Algiers because of the security issues in the Saharo-Sahelian strip, especially after the departure of their troops from Mali, whose presence provoked the rejection of Malian public opinion.
Indeed, Algiers sponsored the Algiers Accords signed in May 2015 between the Algerian government and the Tuareg rebellion of the Coordination of Tuareg Movements of Azawad, which did not, moreover, bring peace to the region. because of the proliferation of militias, their delayed disarmament and the artificial distinction between Tuareg separatist and jihadist rebellions.
The Algerians also have very good relations with the Malian junta in power in Bamako, which is very hostile to France, preferring Russian mercenaries to the Barkhane force.
The French need the Algerians to redefine their relations with the Sahel and have a common enemy the jihadists of the GSIM (Support Group for Islam and Muslims), led by the radicalized Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, a former militiaman in the service of the Colonel Gaddafi. He pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, led by the Algerian Abou Oubaïda Yousef al-Annabi, a former member of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group). Iyad Ad Ghali has allied himself with the Fulani jihadists of Katiba Macina. GSIM, now active in central Mali, with strike possibilities in the south of the country, represents a threat to all of West Africa where France retains interests and a lesser threat – for the moment – to Algeria.
Concerning the deepening of economic relations, Algeria is asking for more productive investments from French companies and technology transfers, particularly in the energy sector, in the field of renewable energies with solar energy, and in high technologies. She wants a diversification of French investments in Algeria.
The weight of the colonial past
Franco-Algerian relations are obviously also an internal affair in France. Emmanuel Macron announced during his stay the transition to a chosen Algerian immigration of skilled workers and students. This chosen immigration has already begun in practice with the settling in France of many Algerian general practitioners and computer engineers from Algerian Grandes Ecoles and universities.
This selective immigration policy can lead to negative effects for Algerian development because of the brain drain it represents for the country of departure. Paris no longer seems to want the old Algerian migrations of low-skilled workers. However, these populations have participated in the construction of France from the First World War to the present day.
Deepening the Franco-Algerian relationship requires ironing out the evils inherited from the colonial past and the war that are at the origin of our strong and special relationship with Algeria. During his visit to Algiers, Presidents Macron and Tebboune announced the creation of a joint commission of French and Algerian historians to jointly establish the facts. Note that the 2021 Stora report only recommended the appointment of a commission of historians on the Oran massacres and not a globally competent commission of historians.
The work produced by this new commission of historians, if it actually sees the light of day, could legitimize France’s recognition of the crimes of colonization – even if it is unlikely that the French president will repeat the comments he had made. in 2017 as a candidate, when he spoke of the crimes against humanity committed by France in Algeria.
If he refuses repentance and does not want to pronounce the official apologies requested by Algeria, such a strong recognition of the past by the French political power, legitimized by common historical work, could however be the foundation of a new relationship with Algeria, by lifting the obstacles to cooperation between our societies and by allowing the youth of our two countries to fully envisage a common future free from hatred and rancor. This initiative is probably one of the last chances of President Macron, who would like to go down in history as the reconciler of France and Algeria.
Looking at historical truth in the face, in all its complexity
If we can only rejoice at the awareness of French and Algerian political power of the need to move from memory to history, a process that has moreover been largely initiated in the work of several generations of historians – that they relate to the history of Algerians before 1830, the conquest of Algeria, the history of French colonization, the Algerian war and its tragic end with the French nuclear tests in Algeria, the massacre of October 17, 1961, the abandonment of the harkis, the massacres of Oran… – such a commission will have to raise the painful question of state responsibilities at the highest level of the state.
She cannot escape the sequence of the end of the Algerian war and will have to face the gaze of the statue of Commander of General de Gaulle, the last great French statesman of the 20th century, without forgetting the unspoken Algerian official memory. This global consideration of Franco-Algerian history is essential for two nations condemned in all cases by this same traumatic history to have a common future.
